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Bridging the gap between DeafBlind
minds: interactional and social
foundations of intention attribution in
the Seattle DeafBlind community
Terra Edwards*
Department of Linguistics, Gallaudet University, Washington, DC, USA
This article is concerned with social and interactional processes that simplify pragmatic
acts of intention attribution. The empirical focus is a series of interactions among
DeafBlind people in Seattle, Washington, where pointing signs are used to individuate
objects of reference in the immediate environment. Most members of this community
are born deaf and slowly become blind. They come to Seattle using Visual American
Sign Language, which has emerged and developed in a field organized around visual
modes of access. As vision deteriorates, however, links between deictic signs (such as
pointing) and the present, remembered, or imagined environment erode in idiosyncratic
ways across the community of language-users, and as a result, it becomes increasingly
difficult for participants to converge on objects of reference. In the past, DeafBlind
people addressed this problem by relying on sighted interpreters. Under the influence
of the recent “pro-tactile” movement, they have turned instead to one another to
find new solutions to these referential problems. Drawing on analyses of 120 h of
videorecorded interaction and language-use, detailed fieldnotes collected during 12
months of sustained anthropological fieldwork, and more than 15 years of involvement
in this community in a range of capacities, I argue that DeafBlind people are generating
new and reciprocal modes of access to their environment, and this process is aligning
language with context in novel ways. I discuss two mechanisms that can account for this
process: embedding in the social field and deictic integration. I argue that together, these
social and interactional processes yield a deictic system set to retrieve a restricted range
of values from the extra-linguistic context, thereby attenuating the cognitive demands of
intention attribution and narrowing the gap between DeafBlind minds.
Keywords: intention attribution, deictic reference, pointing, DeafBlind, Tactile American Sign Language, deictic
integration, practice
Introduction
This article analyzes some of the social and interactional mechanisms that constrain pragmatic acts
of intention attribution among DeafBlind people in Seattle, Washington. In particular, it focuses
on the use of pointing signs and the means by which potential referents in the environment are
narrowed down. In visual signed languages, pointing signs can be used gesturally, but they are also
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recruited by the grammar, taking on a range of linguistic
functions (Friedman, 1975; Klima and Bellugi, 1979; Supalla,
1982; Petitto, 1987; Padden, 1988; Engberg-Pedersen, 1993;
Liddell, 1995; Taub, 2001; McBurney, 2002; Meier, 2002;
Rathmann and Mathur, 2002; Pfau and Steinbach, 2006; Pizzuto,
2007; Coppola and Senghas, 2010; Meier and Lillo-Martin,
2013; Gökgöz et al., 2015). Evidence for this includes, among
other things, that some pointing signs are acquired by children
according to developmental patterns similar to learners of
corresponding spoken language forms (Petitto, 1987; Pizzuto,
2007: p. 292; Gökgöz et al., 2015), they appear to have syntactic
distributions that are the same as corresponding elements in
spoken languages (Padden, 1988), but different from co-speech
pointing gestures (Cormier, 2014:4, Cf. Johnston, 2013), and they
are subject to visual and processing constraints that apply to
linguistic, but not gestural phenomena (Siple, 1978; Emmorey,
2002).
There are, however, unresolved theoretical issues regarding
characteristics of pointing signs that are difficult to account for
from phonological, morphological, and syntactic perspectives
(Mathur, 2002; Pizzuto, 2007). These problems have been
approached from many different angles (see Mathur and
Rathmann, 2012, for a review), and yet, scholars are converging
on the fact that pointing signs, no matter how far into the
grammar they penetrate, cannot be adequately described via
linguistic analytics alone (Liddell, 2003; Dudis, 2004; Johnston,
2013; Meier and Lillo-Martin, 2013; Cormier, 2014). This pushes
pointing in signed languages into the realm of pragmatics, where
questions of intention attribution inevitably arise (Grice, 1971;
Levinson, 1983; Searle, 1983).
In the sign language linguistics literature, intention
attribution, and more generally, speech act theory, has played
a fairly limited role in addressing problems associated with
pointing. Instead, concepts such as cognitive capacity, gesture,
and iconicity have been central and from those perspectives,
constructs such as “real space” (Liddell, 2003: p. 82), “gestural
space” (Rathmann and Mathur, 2002: p. 144), and “iconic
prototypes” (Sandler, 2012) have been proposed. These
constructs tend to assume a non-problematic relationship
between representations (both linguistic and cognitive) and
embodied experience. Liddell for example, defines real space
as “a person’s current conceptualization of the immediate
environment based on sensory input” (Liddell, 2003: p. 82). Real
space is isomorphic with the conceptualizer’s experience of the
environment, and is assumed to be reciprocal across the group of
language-users since “[i]n general, real space lines up well with
physical things in the world” (Liddell, 2003: p. 84). From this
perspective, intention attribution seems pretty simple—you and
I inhabit the same world and/or representation of it, so when I
point to an object or location in real or imaged space, the object
of my attention will likely be self-evident to you1.
For DeafBlind people in Seattle, however, seamlessness
between experience and representation can rarely be assumed.
Most members of the community are born deaf and become
1See Duranti (2010) for a critique of intersubjectivity in the social sciences, which
touches on this and related points.
blind slowly. Everyone becomes blind in different ways and at
different rates. Therefore, sensory capacities and habitual modes
of sensory orientation vary significantly across the group. These
differences are compounded by differences in race, ethnicity,
gender, age, disability, socioeconomic status, sexual orientation,
and school experience (i.e., growing up in a residential school
for the deaf vs. a deaf program within a hearing school,
etc.). Furthermore, tactile reception of Visual American Sign
Language (VASL) was, until recently, the only available choice.
Since VASL emerged and developed among sighted people,
and is therefore built around visual modes of access and
orientation, it is only partially perceptible via tactile reception,
much as spoken English is only partially perceptible via lip-
reading (see Edwards, 2014b). In other words, for DeafBlind
people, the systems of representation historically available to
them are shaped by a world that they can no longer access.
In addition, authority accrued to sighted social roles, and
legitimacy accrued to visual modes of communication, therefore,
in order to maintain one’s position and status in the social
order, tactility had to be avoided. In the past, these barriers were
considered too great to surmount and direct communication
between DeafBlind was rarely attempted (Edwards, 2014a:
pp. 86–90). Instead, DeafBlind people communicated via
sighted interpreters. However, since 2007, a socio-political
movement known as the pro-tactile movement has opened up
new possibilities for direct communication between DeafBlind
people.
The pro-tactile movement is based on the idea that all human
activity can be realized via tactile-kinesthetic channels, including
interaction and language-use. Therefore, interpreters are not
necessary for DeafBlind people to interact with each other or
their environment. However, in order to legitimize practices built
around tactile modes of access, social restrictions on touch have
to be relaxed and experimentation encouraged. In 2010 and 2011,
a series of 20 pro-tactile workshops was led by two DeafBlind
instructors for 11 DeafBlind participants with these aims inmind.
This paper focuses on several interactions between DeafBlind
people that took place as part of the pro-tactile workshops2. The
interactions were videorecorded by a team of three videographers
from multiple angles (120 h of video data was collected in total).
Sequences of communicative activity where DeafBlind people
coordinated and directed each other’s attention to particular
dimensions of setting were subsequently isolated, and the ways
in which pointing signs were produced and responded to were
considered3. Examining thesemoments amongDeafBlind people
2This study has been approved by the Committee for Protection of Human
Subjects at the University of California, Berkeley, and all research subjects have
given their informed consent.
3When these data were collected, I made an extensive list of transcribed entries,
describing and translating interactions that were of interest, given my theoretical
interests at the time. I also included things that seemed to diverge in significant
ways from what would be expected in visual signed language communities.
Each entry includes a video code and a time code, and the overall document
functions like an index of notable interactional events. This index is 60 pages
long and contains roughly 100 descriptions and/or translations of communicative
sequences. For purposes of this article, I reviewed this index, and drew on it
for some of the examples. In addition, I returned to the raw data, looking for
patterns specific to demonstratives and locatives; please see footnote at the end
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in Seattle offers unique insight into how language and context
are brought into alignment with our embodied experience of the
world.
In Speech Acts and Intentional States from a Practice
Perspective, I begin with a discussion of intention attribution
viewed through the lens of practice theory (Giddens, 1979;
Bourdieu, 1971, 1990 [1980]; Hanks, 1996, 2005a,b; Edwards,
2012, 2014a,b). From this perspective, embodied knowledge takes
on a crucial role for language-users as they work to converge
on specific, pragmatically situated meanings and effects in
interaction. I argue that these embodied forms of knowledge arise
in dynamic tension with structured and historically pre-given
fields of social and interactional activity. In Embedding in the
Social Field, I consider the effects of these tensions on language-
use. Drawing on Hanks (2005b), I argue that embedding in the
social field involves the legitimation of new styles, modalities,
and genres, as well as the authorization of some language users
(and not others) to evaluate linguistic forms and communicative
practices as correct, appropriate, polite, or not. I argue that
this dual constraint of legitimation and authorization restricts
the range of feasible moves and interpretations in interaction
among DeafBlind people in ways that simplify the cognitive tasks
required for intention attribution. In The Deictic System and the
Deictic Field, I ask how these two constructs work in tandem to
structure deictic reference (Bühler, 2001 [1934]; Hanks, 2005a).
When a deictic sign is instantiated, contextual values must be
retrieved and coordinated, and patterns in retrieval have an
effect on the internal organization of the language. I call this
process “deictic integration.” Via detailed analysis of interactional
sequences among DeafBlind people, as well as attention to their
metapragmatic commentary, I show how deictic integration
is accomplished in the workshops. In Deictic Integration and
Appropriate Pointing in TASL: Embedding and Integration in
the Social and Deictic Fields, I argue that in conjunction with
embedding in the social field, deictic integration is giving rise
to a deictic system in Tactile American Sign Language (TASL),
which diverges from the visual system on which it is scaffolded.
Evidence for this claim includes an emerging distinction between
demonstratives and locatives in TASL represented by a difference
in movement (tapping vs. tracing, respectively). I show how
these changes emerged as certain practices for pointing were
deemed appropriate and others were deemed inappropriate
by DeafBlind leaders, who are invested with the requisite
authority. I conclude in the final section, with some reflections
on the role of deictic integration and embedding in the social
field for simplifying the task of intention attribution from
the perspective of the DeafBlind participant. In particular, I
emphasize the importance of socially transmitted forms of
embodied knowledge in fitting the linguistic system to particular
fields of activity, thereby narrowing the gap between DeafBlind
minds.
of Appropriate Pointing in TASL: Embedding and Integration in the Social and
Deictic Fields. I have also participated in the practices described here over the past
15 years of in-depth ethnographic engagement, and have developed an intuition
for patterns in language that are new, and those that are not. I am relying on all of
these forms of knowledge in my analyses.
Speech Acts and Intentional States from a
Practice Perspective
When people apply linguistic resources in the speech situation,
they are not only producing semantic meanings; they are also
performing pragmatic actions such as informing, requesting,
and asserting (Austin, 1965; Searle, 1969; Grice, 1989). And
yet, when utterances are taken out of context, the pragmatic
layer can collapse, revealing a kind of “residual semanticity”
or indeterminacy that can be manipulated by speakers to deny
specific inferences: “Thus, the characteristic speaker’s denial of
speech offensive to the hearer takes the form of ‘all I said was. . . ”’
(Silverstein, 1976: p. 47). Reducing an utterance in this way
produces many possible interpretations, whichmust be narrowed
to generate specific meanings and effects in interaction. One
of the ways that participants accomplish this is by attributing
communicative intentions to their interlocutor (Grice, 1971;
Levinson, 1983; Searle, 1983).
Intention, in the sense of meaning to do something, is just
one of many intentional states. Broadly construed, a mental
state is intentional insofar as it is directed toward an object
or state of affairs (Searle, 1983: pp. 1–37). Other intentional
states include, for example, belief, love, elation, anxiety, irritation,
and remorse4 (Searle, 1983: p. 4). It is in this broader sense
that the term is taken up here. Intentional states correspond
in many ways to speech acts; speakers can insist that their
interlocutor leave the room in much the same way as they
can believe, fear, or hope their interlocutor will leave the room
(Searle, 1983: pp. 5–6). These kinds of correspondences come
together in Searle’s “conditions of satisfaction,” including, for
example, his sincerity condition5. Each time an illocutionary
act is performed, an intentional state is expressed via the same
propositional (or representative) content (Searle, 1983: p. 9).
Insofar as the intentional state and the illocution correspond, the
speaker satisfies the sincerity condition. For example, if I say, “It
is snowing,” I have produced an assertion (speech act), which
corresponds to the belief (intentional state) that it is snowing.
If I believe it is snowing when I assert that it is snowing, I have
satisfied the sincerity condition. The sincerity condition is one
among many, which link utterances (and other representative
content) to a psychological and/or illocutionary mode, thereby
specifying its meaning or effect.
However, anthropologists have shown that such conditions
are culturally and historically specific, that they presuppose
certain notions of personhood, and they can be more or less
attenuated in different communicative contexts (e.g., Silverstein,
1976; Rosaldo, 1982; Duranti, 1984; Ochs, 1984; DuBois, 1987;
Hanks, 1990; Kockelman, 2010). My aim is to build on this work
by considering the role of embodied knowledge and practical
circumstance in structuring the convergence of the speaker
and addressee’s intentional states on objects of reference in the
immediate environment (Bourdieu, 1971, 1990 [1980]; Giddens,
1979; Hanks, 1996; Edwards, 2012, 2014b; Hanks, 2005a,b). To
4These are intentional states insofar as they are directed. Diffuse anxiety or elation,
with no identifiable cause does not count as an intentional state for Searle.
5Cf. Austin’s first Gamma condition (1965: p. 15) and Grice’s maxims of quality
(1989: pp. 27–28).
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this end, I begin with the practical communicator, who exists in
a world of routine, where much of what is said is anticipated
and much of what is done could be done without saying much
(Hanks, 1996). Informed by practice theory, I assume that
patterns that emerge out of that regularity do not inhere solely
in the linguistic system, nor can they be isolated in a static
and detachable set of conditions or rules. Rather they cohere
in the relations between the language-user, the language, and
the specific fields of socio-historical and interactional activity
where each is shaped. Embedded in routine patterns of embodied
activity, the cognitive tasks required for generating pragmatically
situated meanings appear less demanding than they might
otherwise appear. In what follows, I outline three key concepts
required for understanding intention attribution in a practice
framework: habitus, field, and embedding.
Habitus
Habitus is an acquired system of generative schemes, which
predisposes actors to perceive, think and act in ways that feel
correct, appropriate, and polite (Bourdieu, 1990 [1980]: pp.
52–65). Individuals share a habitus insofar as they are subject
to social and material conditions that reinforce a ground of
common sense ideas and behaviors, which, in turn, tend to
reproduce the conditions that gave rise to those ideas (Bourdieu,
1971: p. 80). This circular process tends to convert history into
second nature and in doing so, harmonizes the practices of
the group in ways that are not transparent to its members.
Harmonization is most apparent, analytically, in non-reflective
patterns of thought, action, perception, and navigation6.
Individual differences can only be evaluated reciprocally against
the backdrop of a common habitus (Bourdieu, 1971: pp. 81–86).
Frames for evaluation, which tend to restrict possibilities
for action, are an integral part of the habitus. These frames
derive from the Aristotelian notion of hexis: an intention
(or desire) to act together with reflexive judgments of that
intention, guided by, or weighed against, frames of social value
and meaning (Hanks, 2005a: pp. 69–72). Under the influence
of Merleau-Ponty, Bourdieu’s notion of hexis shifts analytic
attention from the mind to the habituated activity of the
body:
The evaluative perspective, once embodied, emerges as active
perception, and the intentional states of desire and purpose
become the inclination of body posture (Hanks, 2005b: pp.
71–72).
While Bourdieu locates hexis in the body and its dispositional
tendencies, Giddens locates this kind of reflexive monitoring
on three, distinct planes of consciousness: practical, discursive,
and unconscious (1987: pp. 1–49). I focus here on the first two:
practical and discursive consciousness. Practical consciousness
accounts for “the tacit knowledge that is skillfully applied in
the enactment of courses of conduct, but which the actor is not
able to formulate discursively” (Giddens, 1979: p. 57). While
practical consciousness accounts for what actors know how to
6Cf. Grice’s cooperative principle (1989: p. 26).
do, discursive consciousness accounts for the knowledge actors
are able to talk about.
Among DeafBlind people, dimensions of practice that would
normally remain tacit are projected onto a discursive plane. This
provides an unusual opportunity to see how embodied modes of
knowledge contribute to the narrowing of interactional potentials
in practice. For example, during the pro-tactile workshops, a
group of DeafBlind people were playing a tactile version of
charades. Someone would enact a character or person, everyone
would explore the enactment tactually, and then they would take
turns guessing who it was. After one of these games, an instructor
asked a participant about his experience7.
Instructor: Was the game over there fun?
Participant: Yeah, but Chantelle had us all stand up while she
did an elaborate performance of Marilyn Monroe.
Then when we went to sit down, we all ran our
heads into each other.
Instructor: Maybe if you did this [instructor puts hand on
participant’s shoulder, signs ready with the other
hand, and begins to sit down], maybe that would
work. Coming up with things like that, that’s called
“pro-tactile.” We have to be creative, because we
can’t see. We need new ways of coordinating
group actions, like sitting down [they experiment
with sitting down while touching each other’s
shoulders]. Maybe like that? [both smiling]. Do you
think it’s a good idea? [Participant: yes]. Great! I’ll
tell Adrijana about it, OK? [Participant: yep].
Here, DeafBlind participants are talking about a breakdown in
practical sequence, where an embodied disposition that works
well for the sighted leads to injury. When breakdowns like
this occur, practical activity becomes an object of discursive
reflection as the instructor and the student explicitly talk about,
and try out, different combinations of communicative cues and
body postures. After a few attempts, they agree on a particular
strategy and the instructor says she will tell her co-instructor
(Adrijana) what they have come up with. This shows that a
strategy has been chosen and legitimized, making it a candidate
for the communicative repertoires collaboratively constructed
in the workshops. This process gives rise to novel practices
while also linking them to social, evaluative frames associated
with correctness, politeness, and appropriateness. Innovations
that stick recede from discursive consciousness into practical
consciousness. Part of what determines whether something will
stick, and therefore recede, is the degree to which the practice
is commensurate with the emergent, reciprocal body-schema of
pro-tactile people.
Reciprocity and the Body Schema
In a practice framework, the body schema is neither a
representation of the body, nor a mere physical fact about
the body (Hanks, 2005a: p. 69). Rather, it accounts for the
“momentary grasp that actors have of being a body” (Hanks,
2005a). When the Marilyn Monroe charade was over and the
7Dialog was translated from American Sign Language into English by the
researcher.
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participants began to sit down, their heads collided because
their grasp of being a body, or their body schema was not
commensurate with tactile modes of access. The collision
presented an opportunity to bring representation, practice, and
the physical surround into alignment. Practical strategies that do
not lend themselves to such alignments tend to fall away over
time as an inhabitable world coheres.
In a coherent, inhabitable world, hexis and the body schema
work together to generate a reciprocity of perspectives (Schutz,
1970: p. 183). Where there is reciprocity, shared evaluative
frames are applied to the reflexive grasp that DeafBlind actors
have of being a body. Without this kind of reciprocity, people
collide and are injured. They also have difficulty communicating,
and these two facts are not unrelated. Where perspectives on
the physical and social world are not reciprocal, propositional
content appears under no particular perspective; the pragmatic
layer never quite crystalizes, and the indeterminacy of language
becomes a persistent, practical problem. The body plays a
crucial role in addressing such problems, not as a physical or
representational mechanism, but as the site of a reflexive grasp
that social actors have of being a body. However, the tactile body
demands relations to the world and to other people, which may
appear inadmissible from a social perspective. In order to account
for these constraints and their reconfiguration among DeafBlind
people in Seattle, I appeal to the notion of the social field.
The Social Field
The social field is a structured space of positions and roles, along
with the historically specific means by which those positions
and roles are occupied by social actors (Hanks, 2005a: p. 72).
In the social field, speaking is a means of position-taking,
which is dually constrained by legitimation and authorization
(Hanks, 2005a: 72–73). Legitimation accrues to styles and genres
of language use, knowledge of which is limited by social and
economic position. Limitations on who has access to legitimate
styles and genres restrict access to power, reinforcing unequal
power relations. Authorization, on the other hand, is invested in
the actors themselves, via the social roles they occupy (Hanks,
2005a: p. 76).
For DeafBlind language-users, dynamics in the social field
include not only genres and styles of language-use, but also
the relative legitimacy of different channels through which
linguistic signs are exchanged (i.e., visual-kinesthetic vs. tactile-
kinesthetic), the modes of access used to link linguistic
signs to people, things, and events in the environment (i.e.,
memory, perceptual access, shared knowledge), and the relative
authorization of social actors who habitually draw on and
reproduce those channels in reciprocal ways (i.e., “visual people”
vs. “tactile people”). Historically, visual channels and modes of
access accrued more legitimacy than their tactile counterparts
(Edwards, 2014b). Therefore, as DeafBlind people competed
for resources in the social field, it was advantageous for them
to continue communicating via visual channels and modes of
access, even after they had become blind8. This meant that they
did not have direct access to things like body posture, eye-gaze,
8See Edwards (2014b: pp. 118–143) for further discussion.
and other embodied behaviors, which are transmitted by the
habitus. Therefore, there was no way for one DeafBlind person
to evaluate another against shared frames of social value. Instead,
they relied on sighted people to share their interpretations and
impressions. DeafBlind people were always removed from the
embodied knowledge required for position-taking in the social
field.
The inception of the pro-tactile movement brought with it
a reconfiguration of social roles and positions, new ways of
linking evaluative frames to embodied experience, and novel
patterns in position-taking. Rather than accruing legitimacy by
communicating as sighted people do, an internal hierarchy was
established within the Seattle DeafBlind community. A small
minority of DeafBlind signers, who were, importantly “tactile
people” emerged as leaders and they applied their authority in
judgments about the correctness of certain linguistic forms and
communication practices. As a result, some embodied behaviors
(and not others) became legitimate ways of being smart,
polite, interesting, “culturally DeafBlind” and so-on. Patterns in
language-use were caught up in this broader transformation,
and novel linguistic forms began to mark new social distinctions
(Edwards, 2014b). From there, pro-tactile practices could be used
to acquire resources in the social field (e.g., prestige, membership,
employment, etc.), without relying on the impressions, opinions,
or interpretations of the sighted.
For example, in the following exchange, Lee, one of the
instructors, identifies some linguistic forms and practices as
appropriate, and others as inappropriate. In doing so, she is
also legitimizing tactile modes of access to the environment and
downplaying the necessity of visual access9.
Lee: The announcements for today are about the new rules. First,
the video people—[. . . ]—you’re not allowed to talk with
them. You’re not allowed to ask them, as sighted people,
where things are or where people are. So the film people
are “not here.” That’s crucial. [. . . ] That’s the first rule. [. . . ]
The second rule is that you have to be assertive—and feel
around! You can’t just stand there and wait for someone to
tell you what to do.
Rules like this pushed participants toward tactile modes of access
and exchange. DeafBlind leaders naturalized the practices that
emerged as a result by labeling them culturally appropriate,
correct, polite, and “pro-tactile.” For example, Adrijana explained
to one of her students that
if someone is eating, and you touch their arms and their face,
you will figure out they are eating. Then you know to leave
them to their meal. It’s the same thing with any other activity
someone might be doing. You feel their arms, and then that
leads you to some other part of their body, maybe their hands,
and then you know what they’re doing and how to interact
with them. The point is that touching people for the purpose
9This exchange took place in the second of 10 pro-tactile workshops, when
basic problems were being identified. The only sighted people present during
the workshops were working as part of the research team, videorecording the
interactions.
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of gathering information is perfectly acceptable. So that is, in
essence, what today’s class has been about. [. . . ]
Adrijana is inviting her student to reconsider habitual,
dispositional ways of interacting with others and with the
environment. The appropriateness or inappropriateness of these
practices is deeply ingrained from childhood, so abandoning
established practices feels like a risk. Because Adrijana is invested
with the requisite authority, her students took her up on her
invitations, regardless. Where they felt resistance, they were
encouraged to reflect. In one workshop, a participant identified
the relative physicality of tactility and visuality as a potential
problem for the pro-tactile movement. She argued that sighted
people don’t understand the range of things that touch can do,
and too often assign sexual or romantic meanings to tactile
signals.
They have to understand that touching is about feeling—its
about having access to emotion—just like they have through
vision. Touch is no more physical than vision.
These kinds of social facts—for example the commonly
held idea that touch is more physical than vision—become
apparent to DeafBlind people when they try to substitute
tactile communication strategies for visual ones, and have the
reflexive sense that they are doing something inappropriate.
In response, Adrijana insisted that DeafBlind people must not
comply with those impulses. Instead, she encouraged them
to apply pressure to established social norms (i.e., join the
pro-tactile social movement), or else suffer the effects of
isolation:10
When people use their eyes for seeing, that causes them to feel.
When people use their ears for hearing, that causes them to
feel. [M]ost DeafBlind people have beenmissing out on feeling
because we’ve been so focused on [language], and that’s all. But
there’s this whole environment around us—a whole world—
and we can’t feel it. So that’s why [the pro-tactile movement]
is so important and why it has to include ways for us to feel
things again. [. . . ] We need more stimuli for our bodies to
interpret. All of that is part of “pro-tactile.”
Adrijana is not arguing that DeafBlind people are physically
incapable of “feeling the world.” Rather, she is arguing that
tactile modes of knowing have historically been limited by
excessive social restrictions. Relaxing those restrictions requires
new relations to be established between the habitus, the linguistic
system, and the social field where touching is evaluated. I analyze
this process as a kind of embedding in the social field (Hanks,
2005b).
Embedding in the Social Field
Broadly speaking, embedding is a process through which highly
schematic form-meaning correspondences undergo reshaping,
conversion and transformation as contextual values are retrieved
(Edwards, 2014b; Hanks, 2005b: p. 194). Through patterns in
10See also Sauerburger (1993: pp. 87–98) on isolation in DeafBlind populations.
retrieval, the linguistic system is aligned with its contexts of
its use, generating a restricted range of feasible interpretations.
Four mechanisms of embedding have been proposed: practical
equivalences, counterparts, rules of thumb (Hanks, 2005b)
and integration (Edwards, 2012: pp. 52–63, 2014a: pp. 26–
27). Practical equivalences, counterparts, and rules of thumb
transform the meaning associated with forms as they are
instantiated. Integration, in contrast, affects both form and
meaning.
Embedding in the social field involves: (1) the legitimation
of certain styles, modalities, and genres of language-use for
taking up recognizable social positions, along with the embodied
knowledge necessary to do so, and (2) authorization of some
language-users to evaluate linguistic forms and communicative
practices as correct, appropriate, polite, or not. In the social field,
the effect of an utterance will be different depending on who
produces it and what social position that person occupies. For
example, in Yucatec Maya, an utterance produced by a shaman
about a divining crystal will have a particular effect because of
the authority invested in him and the social position he occupies,
just as a radiologist’s position authorizes him to interpret x-
rays (Hanks, 2005b: p. 202). However, position is not enough.
Legitimate modes of language-use, body posture, dress, overall
comportment, and other aspects of practice must be convincingly
enacted as well.
Legitimation and authorization constrain position-taking,
thereby restricting the range of feasible moves in any interaction
and the feasible interpretations of any utterance. In a practice
framework, these restrictions are not listed a priori as maxims
(Grice, 1989) or conditions (Austin, 1965; Searle, 1983). They
are instead historically specific relations that cohere between: (1)
actors, (2) social roles and positions, along with the structures
they fit into, and (3) the embodied and linguistic knowledge
required for taking up those roles and positions in legitimate
ways. These relations are amenable to ethnographic, historical,
and interactional analysis, and they have a role in shaping the
internal organization of the language.
However, position-taking in the social field does not have a
direct or determinate effect on the linguistic system. Rather, the
social configuration of the body acts indirectly on the language as
the ground against which reference is achieved. In other words,
in order to individuate an object of reference in the immediate
environment, the language must be aligned with the capacities of
the body, the physicality of the world, and the reciprocal modes
of access that are established across a group of language-users.
In order to grasp these dimensions of practice, a shift in analytic
perspective from the social to the deictic field is required.
The Deictic System and the Deictic Field
The deictic system and its corresponding deictic field structure
how people refer to objects and events in the immediate
environment (Bühler, 2001 [1934]; Hanks, 2005a). The deictic
system is composed of semantic elements which are organized by
contrastive opposition (e.g., this is not that). These oppositions
contribute to the definiteness of reference, or the capacity of
speaker and addressee to pick out a bounded thing among other
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things. Deictic signs also direct the attention of the addressee
to the object by way of mutually accessible relations; this is
the directivity of reference. While definiteness derives from the
deictic system, directivity derives from the deictic field, where
patterns in memory, sensory perception, navigation, and modes
of attention, cohere to generate pathways, channels, grids, and
coordinate schemes that speaker and addressee draw on to
converge on an object. Therefore, all deictic signs are composite,
composed of both “symbols” and “signals” (Bühler, 2001 [1934]:
p. 99). Any time a deictic sign is instantiated, values must be
retrieved from two distinct sources: the deictic system and the
deictic field.
Given stable and reciprocal sensory capacities, relations of
embedding between the two should be so seamless that reference
to objects in the immediate environment feels self-evident,
concrete, and natural to the language-user (Hanks, 1990: p. 5).
However, in the context of radical shifts in sensory capacity, this
apparent concreteness is disrupted, and the means by which the
deictic system and the deictic field are brought into alignment is
revealed.
The deictic system also registers social relations in an indirect
way by aligning the grammar with modes of access that are
reciprocal across a group of language-users (Edwards, 2014b).
Modes of access include patterns in how the body perceives,
moves through, remembers, and inhabits its environment. Any
time signer and addressee converge on a referent in the
immediate environment, modes of access in the deictic field must
be coordinated. Analytically, the body must be viewed under
distinct perspectives in the social and deictic fields11. However,
in practice, the body that grounds reference is also the body that
takes up positions in the social field. If a group of DeafBlind
language-users has been socialized to avoid touching objects in
their environment, it will be difficult to converge on an object of
reference that is available via strictly tactile modes of access.
Therefore, social and deictic pressures are dually exerted on
the linguistic system via the body. Nevertheless, as mentioned
before, distinct analytic approaches are required for grasping
the social and deictic processes that exert those pressures. In
the social field, the analyst aims to understand how particular
styles, genres, and channels are differentiated and legitimized
for purposes of position-taking. In the deictic field, the analyst
focuses instead on how pathways, relations, and dynamics in the
environment are made reciprocal across a group of language-
users as signer and addressee converge on objects of reference.
Possibilities for how pathways in the deictic field can be organized
are constrained at the outset, since many of the routes, relations,
and modalities that could link speaker and addressee to the
object given the physical and cognitive capacities of humans,
are ruled out on social grounds in historically contingent
ways.
Deictic Integration
As social restrictions on touch were loosened among DeafBlind
people, new pathways in the deictic field became available,
11See Edwards (2012) for discussion.
and these pathways affected the internal organization of the
deictic system. I use the term “deictic integration” (Edwards,
2014b: pp. 27–61, 159–190), to account for the coordination
of linguistic elements that derive from the deictic system with
non-linguistic elements that derive from the deictic field into
tighter and more restricted configurations over time so that
(a) when a deictic sign is instantiated, retrievable values are
restricted to a small and alternating set, and (b) deictic signs
are organized by contrastive opposition (e.g., this and that in
English). For example, the pronominal system of VASL makes a
two-way distinction between first and non-first person (Meier,
1990: p. 377). The first person form is encoded in a pointing
sign directed toward the signer and the non-first person form is
encoded in a pointing sign directed away from the signer. This
distinction retrieves values from basic participant frameworks,
which inhere in the deictic field. In other words, these pointing
signs are organized by contrastive opposition, which derive from
the linguistic system, and are set to retrieve one of a restricted
set of values (i.e., first or non-first person) from the deictic
field. The participant frameworks themselves derive from the
deictic field, and only the most schematized, basic, or expectable
configurations make their way into the deictic system (Hanks,
1990: p. 149).
Linguistic pointing signs are therefore distinguished from
pointing gestures according to the tightness of the relations that
obtain between (1) schematic, oppositional categories, which are
repeatable and transportable across contexts, and (2) relations,
roles, and dynamics in the deictic field, where those forms
are routinely instantiated. If a pointing sign is momentarily
altered as it is brought into alignment with some dimension of
context, linguistic and deictic elements are merely coordinated.
If there is a restricted set of values (e.g., person and number
values), and one of those values must be selected in order to
produce a grammatical utterance, linguistic and deictic elements
are integrated. The process whereby the deictic system and the
deictic field are coordinated into tighter and more restricted
configurations is what I am calling “deictic integration.”
Together, embedding in the social field and deictic integration
narrow interactional and referential possibilities, thereby
reducing the cognitive burden that interactants are faced with
as they attribute intentional states to one another. This process
became evident in the pro-tactile workshops as a range of
linguistic forms were deemed inappropriate and fell out of use. It
is not trivial that the first forms to go were VASL pointing signs.
From the perspective of the DeafBlind language-user, many
forms that derive from VASL feel intuitive despite the fact that
they do not describe or articulate to a perceptible world. This is
because the habitus is not redundant with, or even consistent
with, sensory capacity. For example, it may feel natural or
intuitive for DeafBlind people to sit down in the same manner
that sighted people do. However, among exclusively DeafBlind
people, this practice leads to collisions. This highlights the fact
that the habitus can be in direct conflict with the capacities of the
body and its ways of interacting with the physical world.
The same disconnect affects deictic reference. At the
beginning of the pro-tactile workshops, many participants
referred to objects in the immediate environment as if their
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FIGURE 1 | VASL pointing sign.
interlocutors could see what they were pointing at. It took
a person imbued with authority to change such practices by
deeming them inappropriate and suggesting an alternative. From
there, modes of access were brought into alignment and made
reciprocal each time an object of reference was individuated by
way ofmutually accessible relations. This process, which involved
the embedding of language in both the social and deictic fields,
narrowed the range of potential linguistic resources to those
that were “fieldable” (Bühler, 2001 [1934]) and it narrowed the
range of retrievable contextual values to those that were mutually
accessible (Hanks, 2005b). When a fieldable pointing sign is
instantiated, the addressee is not abandoned in unstructured
space with no clues for how to proceed; rather, they are the
recipient of a signal, telling them to choose one path over another
in a highly restricted field of possibilities (Bühler, 2001 [1934]).
Appropriate Pointing in TASL: Embedding
and Integration in the Social and Deictic
Fields
Prior to the pro-tactile movement, pointing signs were produced
for DeafBlind people by sighted interpreters, as would be
expected in Visual American Sign Language (VASL). For
example, in Figure 1, a sighted interpreter (right) is pointing to
a referent in the environment by extending her pointing finger
toward it, along a visually accessible trajectory. The DeafBlind
person (left) receives the sign tactually.
In the pro-tactile workshops, this type of pointing was
deemed inappropriate by the instructors, Adrijana and Lee, and
pro-tactile philosophy became a way of legitimizing alternate
practices. For example, in the following exchange Adrijana
demonstrates to her student that he can’t resolve reference
using VASL pointing signs and she explains that this failure
is predictable from the perspective of pro-tactile (or “PT”)
philosophy.
Adrijana: I’m going to explain PT philosophy to you. I’m
not going to preach. It’s going to be a discussion
between the two of us. So let’s say that I come up
to you, and I start explaining: “There’s a table
over there [pointing], and there’s a wall over
FIGURE 2 | TASL Pointing Sign.
there, and there’s a door further over there.” Do
you understand me?
DB Participant: Yes.
Adrijana: No you don’t. . .
DB Participant: You said that there is a wall over there [points]
and a door over there [points] right?
Adrijana: No, the door is over there [points].
DB Participant: Well, whatever.
Adrijana: Yeah, but that’s exactly it. It’s important. When
people point like that to direct you, and you’re
standing in the middle of the room, you’re
totally lost. Right? [DB participant nods].
You’re sitting here, and it might seem clear for
a minute, but when you stand up and try to find
the things I just located for you, the directions
won’t seem to match the environment and
you’ll be confused. Deaf [sighted] people do
that—they point to places, but that’s not clear.
DB Participant: Well, yeah. That’s visual information.
Adrijana: Right, but it has to be adapted to be pro-tactile.
So instead of pointing, we have to teach them
to do this (See Figure 2).
To demonstrate the appropriate procedure for referring to the
location of the door, Adrijana substituted VASL pointing signs
like the one in Figure 1 for TASL pointing signs like the one in
Figure 2.
Notice that in the above exchange, Adrijana flat out
contradicts the claim made by her student that he understands,
and her student responds by adopting the practice she proposes.
As discussed above, that move is successful is because Adrijana
is invested with the requisite authority. This is a social fact,
which has a particular history (see Edwards, 2014b: pp. 65–113).
This exchange is part of a larger discourse that grew during
the pro-tactile workshops, aimed at associating specific tactile
communication practices with “pro-tactile people” so that using
particular forms is not only a means of accomplishing reference
by linking people, language, and the physical environment, but
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FIGURE 3 | Visual Pathway.
also a means of taking up new and increasingly valued social
positions (Edwards, 2014b). In interactions like these, novel
linguistic forms are embedded in the social field: to be a pro-tactile
person is to point in a particular way. However, the designation
of the form as pro-tactile also derives from the fact that it is
fieldable, and is therefore a feasible candidate for a process of
deictic integration. Novel, pro-tactile pointing signs articulate to
the deictic field of TASL, as opposed to the deictic field of VASL.
Where embedding in the social field and deictic integration come
together, novel linguistic forms tend to emerge.
The deictic field of VASL is organized around visual modes of
access to the immediate environment. For example, in Figure 2,
Adrijana points to a location on the addressee’s palm and
associates it with where they are at the time. She then locates the
wall and the door relative to that against the tactually accessible
backdrop of the addressee’s hand. Then she says, “That’s more
clear, right? Better than [VASL] pointing?” And the participant
says, “Yes. It helps because it’s kind of like drawing a map.
Then you can really visualize where things are.” Notice that
the handshape in both the VASL and TASL pointing signs is
roughly the same: one extended index finger directed toward
the location of a referent. However, the trajectories launched by
the handshape articulate to distinct pathways. Given the body-
schema of a sighted person, the sightline in Figure 3will feel like a
commonsensical trajectory with which a pointing sign can align.
Given the body-schema of a pro-tactile DeafBlind person,
however, the sightline in Figure 3 is likely to be inaccessible
and/or inappropriate. Instead, some kind of tactually accessible
pathway must be located, such as the one in Figure 4, which
includes a straight orienting line that can be identified with a
cane and tracked. Over time, patterns in how lines of travel
intersect, where doors tend to be located, how materials are
organized into common sequences, and so-on, become intuitive
as they are incorporated into the habitus, and an orienting grid
becomes available. In order for reference to be reliably resolvable,
FIGURE 4 | Tactile Pathway.
participants must be able to act as if orienting grids are reciprocal
across the group of language-users, and this as-if clause has some
minimal threshold of actuality built in. If everyone acts as if
they are sighted when they are actually DeafBlind they will not
be able to locate the door. Nevertheless, sensory capacities will
not be consistent across the group—some will have more or less
vision, better or worse vestibular function, and so-on. Therefore,
a reciprocal orienting grid need not be identical, just calibrated
to a coordinate scheme that is good enough for all involved. In
other words, the body schema must be reciprocal, and it must
be calibrated to the interactional and social fields inhabited by
DeafBlind people.
Prior to the pro-tactile workshops, DeafBlind people oriented
to the environment in many different ways, which were more
or less commensurate with their sensory capacities. Those who
relied heavily on sighted people as guides were less likely to
develop navigational habits organized around tactile modes of
access, while those who relied less on sighted people were more
likely. Therefore, body-schemas were not consistent across the
group. This became apparent in many ways to participants
of the pro-tactile workshops, and that recognition led to new
practical routines. For example, before anyone started talking
about or referring to an object, participants would often explore
it tactually. In the following sequence, Adrijana leads a napkin-
folding exercise, which involves learning how to do a “pocket
fold.” In Figure 5, she grips the top of Hanks’ hand, and guides it
carefully along the top edge of the napkin. In Figure 6, she guides
his hand along the parallel edge of the napkin. The two sides have
different thicknesses because one side includes hemmed edges
and the other one doesn’t. She does the same thing with the
remaining two sides of the napkin.
In Figure 7A, Adrijana signs FEEL, and in Figure 7B, she
signs NONE. Then, in Figure 7C, she says, “RIGHT?” followed
by a question marker (not pictured here), meaning, “You don’t
feel any [thickness] there, right?” Then she runs her fingers
over the bottom edge and the left edge of the napkin, drawing
attention to the fact that both of those sides are flat and smooth,
unlike the hemmed edges. Hank acknowledges this, by signing
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FIGURE 5 | Adrijana guides Hanks’ hand across top edge of napkin.
FIGURE 6 | Adrijana guides Hanks’ hand across bottom edge of napkin.
YES (not pictured). Then, Adrijana rotates the napkin so that
the two flatter edges extend away from Hank, and the corner is
pointed toward the edge of the table. Hank’s hands remain on
top of Adrijana’s as she rotates the napkin and also remains in
contact with the table under it, so he can feel the relative position
of the napkin shift. In Figure 8, she uses a flat handshape to
refer to them by moving the edge of her hand back and forth
in line with the edges, meaning something like, “Here is one flat
edge and here is another flat edge.” In this sequence, Adrijana
draws Hanks’ attention to a tactually perceptible difference in two
aspects of the object: two of the napkin’s edges are thicker because
they include hemmed edges, and two of the napkin’s edges are
flatter, because they do not include hemmed edges. Adrijana then
taps twice on the corner of the napkin where the two flat edges
come together (Figure 9), which I have glossed, THIS.
In contrast to many other attempts to single out a
bounded referent, this attempt worked, evidenced by the fact
that later in the interaction, Hank was able to perform the
napkin fold successfully, and also by consistent signals of
understanding throughout this stretch of the interaction. The
reason for its success is that the field of potential referents
was restricted significantly by interactional and social processes.
When Adrijana signs THIS, she signals to Hank to choose one
aspect of the object over another: this corner and not some
other aspect of the object we have previously singled out. This
restriction emerged over the course of several turns, prior to
the moment in Figure 8. In addition, before this interaction,
admissible dimensions of the object were restricted to those that
could be accessed given a particular habitus, and the orienting
scheme that DeafBlind participants were building over the course
of the workshops. Pro-tactile people were beginning to narrow
things down in ways that visual people wouldn’t think to.
The deictic sign registers these restrictions in two senses:
first, it is fieldable, i.e., it articulates to a field organized around
tactile modes of access by being directed toward a location that
both speaker and addressee can touch and distinguish from
other aspects of the object. In contrast, a pointing sign that
launches a trajectory into a visually organized space would not
be fieldable. Second, the form of this deictic sign is perceptible
and easily contrasted with other, perceptible forms. In this
example, two taps on the referent functions as a demonstrative—
Adrijana is trying to single out this part of the object. While
more data is needed, this appears to be an emerging pattern.
In contrast, tracing movements on the body of the addressee
are used to identify the location of one referent in relation to
another (for example, the door, relative to “us” in Figure 2). This
suggests that tapping vs. tracing may be taking on a contrastive
relation in TASL, which corresponds to demonstrative vs. locative
functions12.
12The pro-tactile workshops were naturalistic interactional contexts where there
were many variables in play (as opposed to an experimental context, where
variables are more tightly controlled). Therefore, I am hesitant to make a definitive
claim here, and am currently conducting more controlled elicitations to follow
up on these findings. However, this provisional claim is based on what appears
to be a fairly stable pattern in certain portions of the data. I discovered this
pattern first by developing an intuition as I participated in these practices with
DeafBlind people. I followed up on that intuition by jumping to places in the video
footage where I thought demonstratives and locatives might appear, including the
beginning of each workshop, where the instructors would give directions for the
day, and activities that included instructions on how to manipulate objects, such
as a crocheting exercise, and a direction-giving exercise. I looked for questions like
“which one?,” “where?” or moments where it seemed that the signer was trying to
single out one thing as opposed to something else—e.g., if there were two chairs,
one sitting next to the other one, and a signer tried to draw attention to the one they
wanted their interlocutor to sit it, I recorded the form that was used to accomplish
that task. In the first 6 classes, I noticed that there were a lot of avoidance behaviors,
even when asked specifically to provide locational information, or to single out a
referent among others. There were also many cases where visual pointing signs
were used and these forms were usually followed by confusion, requests for
clarification, re-statement, or the use of English calques, that do not require explicit
locational information to be disclosed. In the first 6 classes, I recorded 21 occasions
on which signs were used to single out a thing among others, or to provide
information about its location relative to other things, and I took note of the form
that was employed. The “TAP.TAP” form that later took on a stable demonstrative
meaning was only produced by one signer, three times in that data set. Then, in
the 7th class alone, I identified 42 tokens of TAP.TAP produced by 7 signers, all of
which occurred in contexts that suggested a demonstrative meaning. I identified
36 tokens of tracing, like the kind described in the napkin example, produced by
4 signers, in contexts that suggested locative meanings. In addition, when these
forms were used, the addressee often produced backchanneling signals used for
agreement, understanding, and continued attentional focus in response. However,
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FIGURE 7 | Adriana asks Hank if he can feel the difference in thickness between the two edges.
FIGURE 8 | Adrijana shows Hank where the flat edges are.
FIGURE 9 | Adrijana refers to a corner of the napkin by tapping on it
twice with a flat hand.
The ability of the addressee to attribute an intentional state
to the signer is augmented by emergent distinctions like these
in the language. It is also reinforced by an emergent, pro-tactile
habitus and the fields with which it articulates. In order for
Adrijana to be successful in teaching Hank to do a pocket-
fold, he must be able to grasp the directedness of her mental
states to answer questions like: what is she focusing on and
singling out for me?Aperceptible contrast between demonstrative
and locative clues is invaluable when faced with such tasks. In
addition, Hank does not have to entertain the possibility that
Adrijana might direct his attention to dimensions of setting that
she knows he can’t perceive. This was not a safe assumption prior
to the pro-tactile movement. These kinds of mutual alignments
between the body, language, and the social world are helping
participants rule out many logically, linguistically, and physically
these interactional contexts are not comparable across the different classes in the
pro-tactile workshops, and there are too many variables to be sure about when,
exactly the pattern emerged, and if, in fact, these forms map consistently onto
a distinction between demonstrative and locative meanings. Therefore, further
evidence is currently being collected and analyzed.
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possible intentional states that could be attributed to their
interlocutors.
Conclusion
In examining social and deictic processes of embedding among
DeafBlind people, I have shown how embodied forms of
knowledge can simplify pragmatic acts of intention attribution,
particularly with respect to deictic reference. I have argued that
as social, interactional, and physical pressures are exerted on
the language via the body, a process of integration is set in
motion and the internal structure of the language is reconfigured.
This suggests that language and context are not linked by way
of external rules, maxims, or conditions. Rather, the linguistic
system is continually adapted to, and shaped by, the historically
specific fields of activity in which it is used. In other words,
as contextual values are retrieved in interaction, patterns begin
to sediment. From within those patterns, some values become
more likely candidates for retrieval than others. In this sense,
the language develops receptors, with particular sensitivities built
in; a tactile language is not set to retrieve values from a field
organized around visual modes of access.
In this article, I have argued that one of the key components
of this process is deictic integration, or the coordination of
linguistic and deictic elements into tighter and more restricted
configurations over time. When an individual acquires a deictic
system, they are acquiring a relational configuration of receptors,
set to retrieve certain dimensions of context and not others.
From this perspective, a range of pragmatic inferences will feel
commonsensical, while others will feel like strange leaps that
only philosophers would make. Following Bourdieu (1971, 1990
[1980]); Giddens (1979), and Hanks (1996, 2005a,b), I locate
this commonsense, practical knowledge in the body, where it
is registered neither as a representation, nor as a physical fact,
but as a reflexive grasp that social actors have of being in
a concrete world, which is often expressed as a dispositional
tendency.
The cognitive tasks required for generating pragmatically
situated meanings are attenuated when viewed from within
the constraints of an individual’s dispositional tendencies. This
is particularly true if, as I have argued in this article, the
social configuration of the body grounds relations between
the language-user, the linguistic system, and the modes of
access that are reciprocal across the group. Caught up in these
complex relations, the body exerts an indirect but consequential
effect on the contextual receptors that develop in any linguistic
system; language anticipates context. I am not arguing, however,
for an assumed or pre-determined fit between conceptual
representations (linguistic or not) and the world13. Rather,
the integration of language and context is the outcome of
socio-historical and interactional processes, which from the
perspective of the addressee, reduce the range of feasible,
intentional objects (i.e., objects to which mental states are
co-directed).
The approach sketched out in this article can also be
distinguished from traditional approaches to speech acts.
Searle’s language-user, for example, would never come out of
an interaction concluding that the reason their assertion or
command was unsuccessful was that the linguistic system itself
was inadequate to the task. Likewise, he would not presume
that a description was unsuccessful because the world was not
accessible in reciprocal ways. However, these are precisely the
assumptions DeafBlind leaders acted on. The practices that were
subsequently established linked language to context in new ways,
and in the process, a range of potential interpretations and
attributions were ruled out—not by a static and detachable set
of conditions, rules, or maxims, but by the reconfiguration of the
language as it was embedded in, and integrated with, new social
and interactional fields.
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